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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, our group used research on human 
emotion to argue that continuous representations 
were a natural tool for affective computing 
(Cowie et al., 2001). The idea has worn well, 
and there is growing interest in the problem of 
using signs in various modalities to construct 
a ‘trace’ that describes how a target person’s 
emotional state appears to be rising and falling 
from moment to moment. However, problems at 
the human end have been perhaps unexpectedly 
obstinate. Progress depends on databases that 
provide traces reflecting human judgments, so 
that machines can use them as models. Acquir-
ing suitable traces poses problems which are 
both substantial and interesting.
The aim of this paper is to provide an 
overview of the issues involved in acquiring 
traces from human raters, and the techniques 
available to solve them. Among those is a new 
system for acquiring traces, Gtrace, designed to 
capitalise on the lessons described here. Some 
of the issues are well known in psychology, 
and are dealt with in sources such as Rosenthal 
(2005). Others are specific to the particular 
technique, and have not been dealt with in a 
systematic way before.
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ABSTRACT
Computational	research	with	continuous	representations	depends	on	obtaining	continuous	representations	
from	human	labellers.	The	main	method	used	for	that	purpose	is	tracing.	Tracing	raises	a	range	of	chal-
lenging	issues,	both	psychological	and	statistical.	Naive	assumptions	about	these	issues	are	easy	to	make,	
and	can	lead	to	inappropriate	requirements	and	uses.	The	natural	function	of	traces	is	to	capture	perceived	
affect,	and	as	such	they	belong	in	long	traditions	of	research	on	both	perception	and	emotion.	Experiments	
on	several	types	of	material	provide	information	about	their	characteristics,	particularly	the	ratings	on	which	
people	tend	to	agree.	Disagreement	is	not	necessarily	a	problem	in	the	technique.	It	may	correctly	show	that	
people’s	impressions	of	emotion	diverge	more	than	commonly	thought.	A	new	system,	Gtrace,	is	designed	to	
let	rating	studies	capitalise	on	a	decade	of	experience	and	address	the	research	questions	that	are	opened	
up	by	the	data	now	available.
DOI: 10.4018/jse.2012010101
2   International Journal of Synthetic Emotions, 3(1), 1-17, January-June 2012
Copyright © 2012, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
BACKGROUND RESEARCH
Tracing techniques emerged from a substantial 
body of research in psychology. Some features 
that people find strange at first sight are in fact 
grounded in long-established findings.
First and simplest, traces almost always 
describe apparent emotion (or affect). It is 
naive to assume, as people sometimes seem 
to, that they ought to describe actual emotion 
(whatever that is). In the terms used by Cowie 
et al. (2001) they provide effect-type rather than 
cause-type descriptions – that is, they describe 
the expected effect of generating particular set 
of signs (facial, vocal, gestural, etc). That is a 
different task from describing either the signs 
themselves (as, for instance, FACS coding 
does); or the inner state that caused them to be 
emitted (which various self-report question-
naires are designed to do).
There is nothing new or unsound about 
distinguishing between objective reality and 
subjective representations of it, and recognising 
that both can be important. It was established by 
17th century philosophers (notably Locke). From 
the early 19th century, research addressed topics 
like colour and the mathematical relationship 
between objective and perceived brightness, 
weight, etc. It in turn made a major contribution 
to the emergence of psychology on one side, 
and technologies dealing with sound and light 
on the other (giving rise to tools such as the mel 
and sone scales, colour spaces, etc.). Given the 
size and sophistication of that research tradi-
tion, it is disconcerting that people still talk as 
if traces should be understood as more or less 
accurate measures of an objective ‘ground truth’ 
(presumably the person’s true emotion). The 
natural view is that their primary function is to 
capture the way observers perceive things. That 
is a different task, with its own challenges and 
uses. In the terms used by Rosenthal (2005), 
the topic is a BC link – the relationship between 
encoder behaviour and decoder judgment.
Historically, there is a strong association 
between tracing and a representation that 
contrasts with everyday language. Day to 
day descriptions use categories that involve 
rather complex combinations of attributes (for 
instance, “anger”, which Aristotle (1941, p. 
1380) described elegantly as “a belief that we, 
or our friends, have been unfairly slighted, 
which causes in us both painful feelings and a 
desire or impulse for revenge”). It is tempting 
to assume that the proper way to describe emo-
tion is in terms of categories like that: anything 
else is a poor substitute. However, when we 
study emotion in naturalistic situations, the 
general rule is that no one description quite 
fits (Cowie & Cornelius, 2003). Categories 
are like landmarks: most of emotional life is 
not exactly at any one landmark, but rather, at 
varying distances from several.
Some recent research has used tracing in 
conjunction with everyday categories, and the 
paper considers later how successful that has 
been. However, most of the work that uses 
tracing in affective computing has followed 
up an implication of the idea that categories 
are like landmarks. It implies that beneath the 
categories lies a system of dimensions along 
which distances can be measured. Psycholo-
gists have been trying to draw out these implied 
dimensions since Wundt (Reisenzein, 1992), 
intuitively at first, but increasingly using vari-
ous statistical techniques (Schlosberg, 1941). 
Four types of dimension have emerged with 
great regularity – valence, energy, power, and 
intensity. There have been intense debates 
about their status. They are clearly not simply 
independent. That is not a mistake, it is a fact 
of the way people represent emotion (see, for 
instance, Reisenzein (1994) on the relationship 
between intensity and the other dimensions). 
It is hotly disputed whether they should be 
considered bipolar or unipolar (Russell, 1979). 
There may be tradeoffs between valence and 
energy, which mean that it is impossible to be at 
extreme values of both simultaneously, leading 
to a naturally circular space (Russell, 1980). All 
of these issues are open to debate, but not to 
pronouncements based on pure intuition rather 
than understanding of the research from which 
standard positions emerged.
People still tend to feel that dimensional 
representations of emotion are less fundamental 
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than descriptions that are closer to everyday 
language, but there are striking counter-
indications. A good example is research on 
managing disturbing emotional memories. 
Pennebaker and Chung (2011) show that putting 
the memories into words helps to bring them 
under control. The implication that matters here 
is that the memories must originally exist in a 
non-verbal format. Dimensional descriptions 
suggest what that raw, non-verbal representa-
tion might be like.
Russell and his colleagues (Feldman Bar-
rett, & Russell, 1999) make a more specific 
claim about dimensional descriptions. They 
argue that they represent a particular component 
of emotional experience, the global feeling 
which has historically been called affect. There 
certainly are advantages to thinking of traces 
as a way of capturing affect, which pervades 
the person in general, rather than emotion in 
the philosophical sense, which attaches to a 
particular object (the person we are angry with, 
the place we regret leaving). Not the least of 
the advantages is that it highlights what dimen-
sional traces cannot be expected to do. If I am 
interacting with somebody, then it matters to 
know whether his negative affect is directed at 
me or at my adversary. Straightforward traces 
not provide that kind of information, and if it is 
important, then they need to be supplemented 
in other ways.
Capturing elusive dimensions of experi-
ence is a problem that arises in many areas of 
psychology, and a great deal is known about 
it. Psychometric techniques approach the 
problem by asking a battery of questions, and 
using a weighted average of responses to them 
as a measure of some underlying dimension. 
However, tracing is more closely related to 
a contrasting approach to measuring mental 
phenomena, psychophysics. Nineteenth cen-
tury psychophysicists developed sophisticated 
experimental and mathematical techniques to 
measure subjective experience. They are still 
current, but there are mismatches between hu-
man responses and the scales they give rise to. 
Twentieth century psychophysicists found that 
direct questions about the intensity of experi-
ence gave results more in line with engineers’ 
experience. In a paper called “The Surprising 
Simplicity of Sensory Metrics”, Stevens (1962) 
showed that direct techniques gave robust re-
sults. There was very good agreement between 
reports of (for instance) apparent brightness 
based on question and answer techniques, 
and reports given by squeezing a handgrip, or 
moving a pointer on a scale. The fact that those 
techniques turn out to be effective, for all their 
‘surprising simplicity’, prompted the develop-
ment of trace techniques in our group.
The tasks that Stevens advocated became 
known as ‘magnitude estimation’ tasks. The 
scales that they involve are not to be confused 
with the scales developed by questionnaire 
designers, who can design alternative responses 
to ensure that outcomes are mathematically 
tractable: they are dictated by the perceiver’s 
experience. Trace techniques also have a spe-
cific contrast with other forms of magnitude 
estimation, which is that responses can be emit-
ted in a continuous stream. These characteristics 
produce a trade-off. The ability to record in 
real time has enormous advantages, not least 
because responses in interactions are likely to 
be based on instantaneous impressions of an 
ongoing display, and there is good reason not 
to assume that studying considered responses 
to brief extracts will reveal what those are like 
(Cauldwell, 2000; Sutton, 2011). The trade-off 
is that experimenters have less control: they 
have to live with the outputs that people can 
make in real time.
Although trace techniques are an example 
of Stevens’ ‘surprising simplicity’ in some re-
spects, the trade-off points to features that are 
anything but simple. People can externalise the 
subjective level of an attribute like loudness 
rapidly, and in various ways. They cannot do 
the same for an attribute like acoustic energy 
between 200 and 400Hz. The point is that some 
attributes are perceptually available in a way that 
others are not: and if we want to use means of 
reporting that people find natural, we can only 
learn about dimensions that they are equipped 
to report. One of the key problems with trace 
techniques is to discover the dimensions that are 
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available to tap in that way. Further complexities 
arise when we consider more than one dimension 
at a time. Some combinations of dimensions 
function psychologically as the axes of a single 
space; others remain psychologically separate. 
In the first case, the dimensions are called 
integrable – the key property being that decid-
ing where in the space a point lays is a single 
judgment. In the second, a separate decision 
is needed for each dimension (Garner, 1974).
It is a clear implication of what has been 
said that some tracing tasks are inappropriate: 
they ask people to do the impossible. That poses 
the question of how to identify appropriate tasks.
It should be clear that some seemingly 
obvious answers are unsatisfactory. The point 
has already been made that agreement with an 
objective ‘ground truth’ is generally an inap-
propriate test. If tracers uniformly agree that 
a display shows deepening concern, then that 
properly reflects the perceptual impression 
that such a display will generate. It is another 
matter whether the concern is real. If people 
want to know that, then they should look for 
other techniques (and take proper note of the 
reasons to doubt whether they exist, see National 
Research Council of the National Academies, 
2003). The example highlights another criterion, 
which is agreement among tracers. If there is 
strong agreement, then there is a strong prima 
facie case for believing that a trace does capture 
a salient dimension of perceptual impressions. 
However, the converse does not always hold. 
Absence of agreement may mean that the scale 
is inappropriate for tracing: there is no easily 
available way to make the judgments being 
called for, and therefore people resort to various 
different sources in the effort to respond. How-
ever, divergence in the traces may also mean that 
people genuinely do respond differently to the 
display being traced; and differences between 
the traces are a faithful reflection of that fact. 
It would be a serious mistake to throw away 
tools that revealed that kind of divergence – not 
just a loss, but a systematic misrepresentation 
of the facts.
The idea that people might perceive the 
same display of emotion differently is not 
sheer speculation. On the contrary, there is 
good evidence that percepts vary with mood 
(Forgas & Bower, 1987), emotional intelligence 
(Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) and culture 
(Sneddon, McKeown, McRorie, & Vukicevic, 
2011). Those cannot be the whole story, because 
there is also evidence that people see different 
patterns in some displays even when they agree 
on the patterns in others (Cowie et al., 2010). 
The relevance of standard personality variables 
remains unclear.
Thinking through the issues, a few op-
tions for validation stand out. One is that a 
trace technique should be trusted if it generates 
agreement when members of a relatively ho-
mogeneous group rate relatively unambiguous 
stimuli. Given that it is reasonable (though not 
failsafe) to assume that divergence elsewhere 
reflects genuine ambiguity in the display and/
or differences between the raters. The data 
summarised provide that kind of evidence 
for some traces. The other options depend in 
practice on collaboration between psychology 
and affective computing. One is confirmation 
by resynthesis. Traces can be used to generate 
descriptions in various modalities – emotion 
words, synthesised faces, schematic gestures, 
etc. Those can be replayed to the tracer along 
with the original display, for him/her to judge 
whether they are apt or not. Deeper, but more 
difficult, is looking at a user’s reactions to 
displays that have been synthesised using his/
her traces. For example, does he/she respond 
to a question asked by an avatar synthesised 
using his/her traces in the same way as to the 
display that he/she traced? That taps into the 
core question about traces, which is their ability 
to predict reactions.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TRACE TECHNIQUES
Given the background, it is not surprising that 
trace-like techniques emerged over a long 
period. The first study to report them system-
atically appears to have been Levenson and 
Gottman (1983). They asked married couples 
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to rate the emotions that they had experienced 
during an interaction by watching a video of it, 
and turning a dial as they watched to indicate 
how positive or negative they had felt at the 
time. The analyses are still worth revisiting. 
For instance, they showed that lag in estimating 
the other partner’s emotion was not a constant: 
on the contrary, it was correlated with marital 
satisfaction. Research using the dial paradigm 
is summarised in Ruef and Levenson (2007). 
Although applications broadened, the main 
focus remained on the analysis of relationships, 
particularly marital relationships.
More complex paradigms began to emerge 
in the 1990s, through teams in Australia and 
Ireland. Both were influenced by Russell’s 
(1980) argument that the bulk of variation 
in emotional life could be explained by two 
dimensions, valence and arousal/activation. 
Following Russell’s terminology, these will be 
called the core affect dimensions.
The Sydney team, led by Schubert, studied 
affect and music, addressing questions such 
as which features of a musical composition or 
performance created particular emotional ef-
fects. Previous research had relied on a discrete 
emotions approach, giving people adjectives 
associated with keystrokes on a computer, 
which they pressed to indicate when each adjec-
tive applied (Namba, Kuwano, Hatoh, & Kato 
1991). Problems with attention and cognitive 
load led Krumhansl (1997) to explore a trace 
methodology which asked, for instance, how 
the level of anger in a piece fluctuates. Krum-
hansl factor analysed these single dimension 
trace ratings of discrete adjectives and found 
a two factor structure with fear and tension 
loading positively on one factor and fear and 
happiness at opposite ends of the second fac-
tor—suggesting an underlying structure similar 
to Russell (1980). Schubert (1999) developed 
an interface called “two-dimensional emotion-
space” or 2DES using the Russell’s core affect 
dimensions, and showed experimentally that it 
could give reliable ratings.
The music research tradition is rich in 
methodological insights. It highlights the im-
portance of distinguishing between the emotion 
apparently expressed by a piece (which cor-
responds to the question asked by the Belfast 
team) and the emotion it evokes in a listener 
(which is much less stable). Music also lends 
itself to work on time-lag. For example, Luck 
et al. (2007) argue that the cognitive load in-
volved in a two dimensional trace may result 
in increased lag between musical features and 
the corresponding participant response. With 
single dimensions, the lag characteristics dif-
fered according to dimension with a different 
pattern of lags for activity, pleasantness and 
strength dimensions depending on which type 
of musical feature they examined.
The Belfast team aimed to develop tracing 
for more general applications. Like Schubert’s, 
their FEELtrace system recorded impressions on 
the two core affect dimensions simultaneously 
(Cowie et al., 2000). The technical differences 
reflect the different intended applications. In-
stead of music, where the user is attending 
to a purely audio input, they wanted users to 
report impressions evoked by audiovisual re-
cordings. As a result, visual feedback from the 
device needed to be accessible at a glance. For 
that reason, FEELtrace incorporated multiple 
features designed to ensure that raters could 
take in the position and trajectory of the cursor 
effortlessly. The current position of the cursor 
was marked by a large disc. It was coloured 
in a way that related naturally to the emotion 
associated with its current position – red for 
pure negative, green for pure positive, yellow 
for pure active, dark blue for pure passive, with 
intermediate hues for intermediate positions. Its 
recent trajectory was marked by a ‘worm’ of 
gradually decreasing circles. There was a clear 
frame around the emotion space, with words 
describing extreme emotions at suitable posi-
tions on the periphery; and words describing 
high frequency emotional states (angry, sad, 
happy, etc.) were located at suitable positions 
within the frame to act as ‘landmarks’.
Two particular concerns shaped the Belfast 
work. One was capturing the emotion conveyed 
by naturalistic material. Cowie and Cornelius 
(2003) argued very explicitly that traces based 
on dimensional theory were the most promis-
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ing way to deal with material characterised by 
subtle, continuously varying emotional colour-
ing rather than clear-cut episodes of full-blown 
emotion. The second was with developing a 
database that would provide a picture of per-
ceived emotion complete enough to be reusable 
for multiple purposes. Output annotated with 
FEELtrace has been made available, and used in 
a variety of studies (Cowie & Cornelius, 2003; 
Ioannou et al., 2005; McKeown et al., 2011; 
Osherenko, Andre, & Vogt, 2009; Caridakis, 
Karpouzis, Wallace, Kessous, & Amir, 2010).
Since the early work, various systems 
have been developed that are conceptually 
similar to 2DES and FEELtrace. RTCRR was 
a replacement for the 2DES system (Schubert, 
2007). EMuJoy (Nagel, Kopiez, Grewe, & 
Altenmüller, 2007) used the same two dimen-
sional space anchored with the words positive, 
negative, arousing and calming, and their cursor 
used a worm and face smiling or frowning to 
signal valence with eyes more open or closed 
to signal arousal. The portable Audience Re-
sponse Facility (pARF) (Stevens, Schubert, 
Morris, & Frear, 2009) offers both one and 
two dimensional measurement but takes the 
novel approach of implementing the response 
on Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) with a 
handheld stylus as input device and collect-
ing through communication responses using 
a centralized server. The portability makes it 
useful for audience situations.
Higher Dimensionality
When completeness is an issue, it is clearly a 
problem that the core affect dimensions capture 
only some of the distinctions that people make 
among emotion-related states. It has long been 
recognised that a third dimension, related to 
power or control, is necessary to make quite 
fundamental distinctions (e.g., between fear 
and anger, which are both active and negative). 
It is incorporated in a dimensional scheme due 
to Mehrabian (1996) that has become well-
known in affective computing, the Pleasure-
Arousal-Dominance scheme, PAD for short 
(Note that the name PAD refers to measures 
derived from a specific set of questions, and it 
is misleading to use it for measures derived in 
different ways – which traces certainly are.) Both 
Sydney and Belfast teams experimented with 
systems that allowed tracing in three dimen-
sions simultaneously, but concluded that they 
were not satisfactory. The attempt to provide a 
single all-embracing device effectively ended 
when Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, and Ellsworth 
(2007) made a strong case for considering a 
fourth dimension related to the expectedness 
or unexpectedness of events.
A natural response was explored within the 
HUMAINE project. HUMAINE was a project, 
funded by the European Community, concerned 
with the general structure of emotion-oriented 
computing, and its main outcomes are reflected 
in the HUMAINE handbook (Petta, Pelachaud, 
& Cowie, 2010). As part of HUMAINE, Devil-
lers, Cowie, and Martin (2006) used an adapted 
FEELtrace interface, with its strong feedback 
arrangements, to make traces on one dimension 
at a time. They used naturalistic clips taken from 
news broadcasts or discussions. Their tracers 
revisited each clip multiple times, providing 
traces not only for the core affect dimensions 
and power, but also two other types of descriptor. 
The first type considered descriptors concerned 
with the strength of the emotion rather than its 
identity. For example, one scale asked how 
intense it was; another whether the person was 
experiencing full-blown, or a weaker emotion-
related state, or was unemotional; another asked 
whether the person was masking emotion. The 
second type revisited a possibility which was 
raised in the introduction, which is to apply 
trace methodology to everyday category terms. 
For example, that kind of scale might ask how 
much anger the target person was feeling; how 
much happiness he/she was feeling; and so on.
Tracing category terms was a possibility 
which had already been considered by a few 
studies. As noted earlier, Krumhansl (1997) 
had found that the information in trace ratings 
of discrete adjectives was effectively captured 
by two dimensions. Douglas-Cowie, Campbell, 
Cowie, and Roach (2003) had also compared the 
reliability of dimensional ratings and categorical 
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descriptions, and found the categorical descrip-
tors gave less robust agreement. Such findings 
suggest that dimensional representations are 
the natural way to achieve a general-purpose, 
economical summary of the way emotion var-
ies with time. But once it is clear that there are 
significant discriminations that are not captured 
by tracing the core affect dimensions, it is logi-
cal to ask how they can best be supplemented. 
Tracing categories may be as useful as tracing 
less robust dimensions.
Table 1 shows the agreement between 
raters on the various scales reported by Devil-
lers, Cowie, and Martin (2006). The format 
is designed to reveal patterns that standard 
formats mask. The unit of analysis is a cor-
relation between the traces made by two raters 
viewing the same clip. The figures show how 
often the correlation indicated that the raters 
in questions formed similar impressions of the 
rise and fall of emotion in a clip, and how often 
they indicated contrasting pictures. Two levels 
of comment can be made.
The first level of comment is that tracing 
clearly can be extended beyond the core affect 
dimensions for affective interactions as well as 
music. The strongest agreement is on the in-
tensity of emotion and whether it is full-blown. 
There is clearly better agreement on those and 
the core affect dimensions than on any of the 
everyday categories, but nevertheless, there is 
quite robust agreement on anxiety, and perhaps 
sadness and anger.
The second of level of comment concerns 
the pattern of agreement and disagreement. In-
tensity and quality of emotion show the pattern 
one would hope for: almost all of the correlations 
are positive. But for many other items, a third 
or more of the correlations are negative, and 
substantial proportion strongly negative. The 
implication is that where one rater feels the 
person is (for example) most serene, the other 
feels s/he is least serene. It seems very likely 
that the very weak agreement on acting yields 
part of the explanation: one rater will judge 
signs of serenity to be real when another judges 
them to be an act, concealing quite the opposite.
It is tempting to conclude that tracing 
should be confined to core affect and intensity, 
because the reliability of other traces is low. In 
Table	1.	Distribution	of	inter-trace	correlations	for	frequently	used	scales	in	Devillers	et	al.	(2006)	
Scale Proportion of trace pairs whose correlations were
very –ve 
(r < – 0.5)
weakly –ve 
(–0.5< r <0)
weakly +ve 
(0< r < 0.5)
very +ve 
(r > 0.5)
intensity 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.89
true emotion/not 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.79
valence 0.13 0.00 0.17 0.70
activation 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.55
power 0.12 0.25 0.29 0.34
masking 0.11 0.24 0.32 0.33
acted 0.15 0.26 0.35 0.24
anxiety 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.50
sadness 0.19 0.06 0.25 0.50
anger 0.06 0.31 0.13 0.50
shock 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50
helplessness 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38
serenity 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.25
8   International Journal of Synthetic Emotions, 3(1), 1-17, January-June 2012
Copyright © 2012, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
the light of what was said earlier, that would be 
a mistake. It may be that people simply cannot 
use a trace methodology (or at least the method-
ology in this study) to report their impressions 
of (for instance) shock. However, it may also 
be that the traces reveal genuine divergence: 
where one person perceives shock, another 
perceives surface gestures with no great bearing 
on the person’s internal state. If so, affective 
computing needs to consider whose interpreta-
tion it will use as a model. It is worth noting an 
implication for research on individual differ-
ences in the perception of emotion. Research on 
individual differences using traces has almost 
always looked at valence and intensity, where 
the data suggest there is quite strong agreement, 
rather than traces that the data show are subject 
to large individual differences.
The same study considered a third type of 
descriptor, drawn from appraisal theory as for-
mulated by Scherer’s group (Sander, Grandjean, 
& Scherer, 2005), though not in a trace context 
(users made a binary decision as to whether a 
descriptor applied or not). Agreement on most 
of the appraisal constructs was low, with one 
notable exception: agreement on conduciveness 
to the individual’s goals was higher than on 
the valence-like constructs considered in the 
same exercise.
The Devillers et al. (2006) study laid the 
groundwork for a paradigm that was developed 
in HUMAINE and later in its successor project, 
SEMAINE. It was concerned with building a 
system that could conduct emotionally coloured 
interactions. Its most relevant outcomes of are 
reflected in Schroeder et al. (2011) and McK-
eown et al. (2011).
Douglas-Cowie et al. (2007) give details 
for the (smaller) HUMAINE study of tracing, 
and McKeown et al. (2011) describe the work 
on tracing in SEMAINE. To summarise the 
latter briefly, all raters were asked to trace the 
dimensions for which there was strong agree-
ment here (intensity, valence and arousal) 
plus the other two that theory suggests are on 
a similar footing (power and conformity with 
expectation). In addition, for each clip, each 
rater identified at least four other descriptors that 
s/he felt were appropriate from a list of options 
based partly on results from previous tracing 
exercises and partly on potential usefulness to 
affective computing.
Data from the SEMAINE tracings are 
examined shortly, but before that, questions 
about analysis need to be considered.
Analysis Techniques
Trace data is a mix of meaningful and effec-
tively random events, and ways of separating 
them are clearly critical. That presents a range 
of problems. The main aim here is simply to 
make it clear that the topic is far from closed.
The default techniques are correlation and 
averaging. Correlation (and its derivatives such 
as Cronbach’s alpha) provide a straightforward 
way of establishing that traces are not pure noise, 
and Sneddon et al. (2011) have shown that with 
large enough samples, averaging can reveal a 
remarkably stable average profile. Rosenthal 
(2005) provides a satisfying description of 
multiple statistical techniques which are com-
mon ground between tracing and other methods 
of studying judgment. For example, Kappa 
(Cohen, 1960, 1968) is widely used to evalu-
ate categorical measures, and can be applied to 
categorical descriptions derived from traces, 
such as the quadrant measures used by Ioan-
nou et al. (2005). The formation of composite 
variables is also a standard issue, and affects 
any attempt to form a more compact description 
from a number of raw traces. However, there 
are issues that are less standard.
One set of issues surrounds temporal 
resolution. Ideally, the interval between points 
in a trace should be chosen so that meaning-
ful responses by the tracer are captured, and 
uninformative activity between them is filtered 
out. Finding suitable intervals is not simple.
Research on music suggests that the fastest 
emotion-related responses there take rather less 
than a second, and so Schubert (2010) recom-
mends a sampling rate of at least 2Hz. It is not 
clear, though, to what extent that depends on 
the material and the dimension being traced: 
International Journal of Synthetic Emotions, 3(1), 1-17, January-June 2012   9
Copyright © 2012, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
visual stimuli can evoke fear-related responses 
in the amygdala in about 12ms (LeDoux, 1998).
Cowie and McKeown (2010) took a sta-
tistical approach to traces from SEMAINE, 
where raters watched audiovisual recordings 
of interactions. Their raw traces were sampled 
above 20Hz. Processed traces consisted of 
series of values, each of which was the aver-
age of the raw trace values during a particular 
time interval (which they called a bin). They 
reasoned that so long as variation within a ‘bin’ 
was effectively random, binning would remove 
noise, and therefore increase agreement between 
raters. For most dimensions, they found no 
effect of bin size in the range 0.1-3sec, which 
suggests that information is present at quite fine 
granularity. However, for expectation, reliability 
peaked strongly with bins in the region of about 
2 seconds. Like the research on lag in music, 
that suggests we should not expect to find a 
single granularity that fits all scales: they have 
different natural time-constants.
A related issue is the effect on correlations 
of the fact that traces are time series (Schubert, 
2010). It is commonly said that correlations 
between time series inflate their relationship. 
In the case of smooth curves, that is clearly 
true, and it makes sense to downsample and 
make comparisons between smaller numbers of 
genuinely independent points. However, traces 
are often quite far from smooth. The largest 
available set of traces is due to Sneddon et al. 
(2011), and reanalysing those, the picture is 
that average inter-tracer correlations increase 
with downsampling up to intervals as large as 
6secs (Cowie & Sawey, 2011). This reinforces 
the point that simple generalisations should be 
treated with caution.
A different set of issues involves identify-
ing informative features rather than considering 
traces as a whole. A promising approach is 
suggested by the ‘stylisation’ techniques used 
in phonetics (Shriberg, Stolcke, Hakkani-Tur, 
& Tur, 2000), where a pitch contour is reduced 
to rises, falls, and level stretches. Successful 
stylisation would have various uses, including 
locating significant features and distinguishing 
emotions which show different time courses, 
such as swinging abruptly between high and 
low or building gradually (Hanratty, 2010). 
Rudimentary stylisation techniques were ap-
plied to the SEMAINE data, and they suggest 
that the distribution of rises and falls extracted 
by stylisation may contribute to distinguishing 
intensity traces in particular (Cowie & McK-
eown, 2010) (Table 2).
A related idea is to ask about features that 
are either agreed by most tracers, or that occur 
more often than would be expected by chance. 
The two criteria suit different types of feature. 
The first, ‘consensus’ criterion has been applied 
to the possible relationships between pairs of 
points in a trace (A>B,A≈B, A<B). Considering 
the proportion of these relationships where 
consensus exists provides a straightforward 
alternative to correlation-based methods of 
assessing whether there is meaningful agree-
ment among raters (Cowie & McKeown, 2010). 
The second has not been developed, but it ap-
pears to be a natural way of dealing with a 
situation that often arises, where (for instance) 
a modest proportion of tracers show similar 
steep rises in the same area (e.g., Figure 1).
Many of these questions are linked to the 
issue raised by Devillers et al. (2006), which 
is that divergent traces may reflect genuine 
differences in the way people way respond to 
the same display. Given enough data, Principal 
Components Analysis (which is related to cor-
relation) may separate different patterns. The 
consensus approach outlined above can only 
separate pattern features that are generally 
agreed from those that are not, but it requires 
less data.
The Standing of Traces
The aim of this section is to convey how 
current information indicates various types 
of trace should be regarded in the context of 
emotionally coloured interactions. The material 
that it refers to is mainly from the SEMAINE 
database, described by McKeown et al. (2011). 
The statistical information that it gives generally 
involves the most familiar of the techniques 
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outlined above, though others are mentioned 
where it seems useful to do so.
Table 2 displays the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients assessing the inter-rater reliabil-
ity in each of the five main dimensions using 
functionals derived automatically from traces 
of SEMAINE database of clips (for example, 
mean, standard deviation, average magnitude 
of continuous rises, etc.).
The robustness of the major dimensions 
seems increasingly hard to doubt, though work is 
clearly needed on the statistical methods that are 
best suited to make the most of the information. 
Note, for instance, that agreement on temporal 
features (particularly rises) seems to be quite 
strong in intensity, but weak in valence: that is 
potentially important for continuous modelling. 
It is much less clear how much is to be gained 
from extending tracing to non-dimensional 
descriptors (i.e., those that are derived by ask-
ing how much of a certain discrete emotion is 
observed).
Some things can be learned from the SE-
MAINE database. In the SEMAINE project 
raters were asked to choose four from a range 
of twenty-seven categories that best described 
people interacting with four conversational 
agents. These categories included discrete emo-
tions and communication related categories.
The major question about categories with 
a strong affective component is how often they 
apply particularly well. Table 3 shows that in the 
SEMAINE material, only amusement applies 
at all often across the board. The qualification 
is that the frequency of discrete emotions rises 
in certain contexts. SEMAINE varies context 
by using four agents: Obadiah, who is gloomy; 
Poppy, who is happy-go-lucky; Prudence, who 
is steadily sensible; and Spike, who is angry. 
Quite substantial numbers of people show 
something that is categorised as happiness in 
response to Poppy, and sadness in response to 
Obadiah. Even so, the data reinforce the point 
made earlier that category words like these 
function as landmarks, and most of emotional 
Table	2.	Alpha	coefficient	for	functionals	associated	with	each	trace	dimension	(*	indicates	al-
pha>0.6	–	the	lowest	value	commonly	considered	acceptable;	**	indicates	alpha>0.7	–	almost	
always	considered	acceptable)	
Intensity Valence Activation Power Expectation
mean all 0.74 ** 0.92 ** 0.73 ** 0.68 * 0.71 **
sd bins 0.83 ** 0.75 ** 0.65 * 0.61 * 0.68 *
max bin 0.74 ** 0.92 ** 0.73 ** 0.68 * 0.71 **
median bin 0.72 ** 0.91 ** 0.72 ** 0.67 * 0.68 *
min bin 0.23 0.9 ** 0.43 0.43 0.43
AveMagnRise 0.74 ** 0.49 0.53 0.39 0.58
SDMagnRise 0.74 ** 0.6 * 0.63 * 0.32 0.59
MaxMagnRise 0.75 ** 0.56 0.64 * 0.25 0.63 *
MedMagnRise 0.49 -0.02 0.26 0.3 0.47
MinMagnRise 0.07 0.08 0.3 0.24 0.16
AveMagnFall 0.68 * 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.51
SDMagnFall 0.66 * 0.45 0.63 * 0.6 * 0.49
MaxMagnFall 0.34 0.13 0.01 0.23 0.24
MedMagnFall 0.52 0.14 0.18 0.31 0.38
MinMagnFall 0.6 * 0.46 0.59 0.6 * 0.41
International Journal of Synthetic Emotions, 3(1), 1-17, January-June 2012   11
Copyright © 2012, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
life occupies ground that lies some distance 
from any landmark.
The communication-related categories 
were used more regularly, as Table 4 shows. 
Even so, the numbers are low. The practical 
issue is whether it is useful to set raters to trace 
qualities which, if this evidence is representa-
tive, are absent around 90% of the time. The 
answer depends partly on agreement between 
raters about the shape of traces. That is hard to 
gauge from SEMAINE data, because any 
given category was not always applied to the 
same clip. Hence a follow-up study asked 
seven raters to identify a subset of the SEMAINE 
categories that they would all use for clips 
showing confrontations.
Table 5 summarises the averages of the 
correlations between each rater’s traces and 
each other rater’s for three selected items. Ten-
sion, which Krumhansl (1997) studied in the 
context of music, is rather consistently rated, 
and it is another candidate for routine integra-
tion into trace descriptions of interactions. But 
although people agree that amusement occurs 
frequently, rater agreement on it is quite low. 
That suggests either that impressions of amuse-
ment are not amenable to tracing, or that people’s 
impressions of amusement differ substantially 
– at least with the material that was traced here.
The study provides a striking illustration 
of the reason for taking the possibility of indi-
vidual differences seriously. The traces in 
Figures 1 and 2 are for intensity, which in 
general is among the most consistently rated 
dimensions, on one of the clips. With this ma-
terial, though, raters divide into two groups, 
Figure	1.	Time	course	of	perceived	Intensity	for	the	same	clip	rated	by	groups	displaying	con-
trasting	rating	styles:	phasic	and	tonic
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which it is natural to interpret in terms of two 
styles of responding: ‘phasic’, where response 
is to relatively short-lived bursts of expression; 
and ‘tonic’, where response is to an inferred 
state that changes relatively slowly (Figure 1). 
A similar tonic/phasic distinction appeared to 
be present for other clips and dimensions, though 
not always as clear-cut. Once that kind of dif-
ference is identified, it is easy to imagine vari-
ous techniques that might be used to explore 
it, and perhaps to obtain not one, but two use-
ful types of information from traces.
Reviewing the material that currently ex-
ists, the natural conclusion is that research on 
trace techniques is placed to move to a new level. 
There is a degree of consensus across studies 
on dimensions that can be traced relatively 
reliably with relatively unambiguous material. 
That opens up the way to address a range of 
subtler issues, involving traceability of more 
specific descriptors, the ambiguities associated 
with some material, and inter-rater differences. 
Addressing the last two depends on statistical 
techniques that are not concerned solely with 
inter-rater agreement.
Response Modalities
The issue of response modality has been touched 
upon at various points, but it is worth pulling 
the issues together explicitly. Various interfaces 
have been used. There are two main issues - the 
extent to which they divert attention from the 
material to be traced, and the extent to which 
they promote consistency.
When the task is to report the emotional 
content of music, it makes sense to use interfaces 
which require sustained visual attention. For 
example, the ‘dynamic judgment’ techniques 
of Grandjean et al. (2011) ask users to trace 
a curve which reflects one dimension of the 
emotional content of music. Schubert and his 
team (1999, 2007) have used two-dimensional 
interfaces that presuppose sustained visual 
attention. At the other extreme, some devices 
have been used to provide responses without 
Table	3.	Most	frequently	chosen	discrete	emotion	descriptors,	and	the	%	of	clips	for	which	they	
were	chosen	(figures	are	%	of	time	chosen;	the	categories	are	not	exhaustive)	
Character Obadiah Poppy Prudence Spike
Amusement 8 14 13 12
At Ease 5 6 7 9
Happiness 2 15 5 1
Sadness 13 1 1 0
Anger 1 0 2 8
Table	4.	The	most	frequently	chosen	communication-related	categories,	and	the	%	of	clips	for	
which	they	were	chosen	(figures	are	%	time	chosen;	the	categories	are	not	exhaustive)	
Character Obadiah Poppy Prudence Spike
Gives Information 10 20 19 9
Agreeing 15 11 15 15
Gives Opinion 12 7 9 11
Thoughtful 10 9 8 4
Certain 4 5 9 4
Interested 3 3 2 2
International Journal of Synthetic Emotions, 3(1), 1-17, January-June 2012   13
Copyright © 2012, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
encroaching on visual attention at all. The dial 
format used by Levenson and Gottman (1983) 
is an early example. Cowie et al. (2011) carried 
the principle to a logical conclusion by using a 
slider with force feedback, in which complete 
emotional engagement was signalled by no 
pressure on the slider, and complete disengage-
ment by maximum pressure. The logic was 
that people who were totally engaged would 
ignore the secondary task anyway, so that the 
instructions worked with natural inclinations 
rather than against them.
Between the two, a variety of interfaces 
have tried to provide visual feedback, but in 
a form accessible enough for users to register 
where they were on the scale at a glance, and 
therefore not to interfere with attention to the 
material to be rated – particularly (but not only) 
if it is visual. That category includes FEELtrace 
and its decendants, including Gtrace, which is 
described below. It also includes the system 
described by Messinger et al. (2008), in which 
raters use a joystick to move a cursor over a 
colour-coded scale.
It seems fair to say that very little is known 
about the relative merits of the various styles of 
interface. Certainly interfaces of the last type 
produce very reliable ratings of some dimen-
sions, particularly valence. That is true whether 
the stimulus is purely auditory, purely visual, 
or audiovisual (Savvidou, 2011). It would seem 
to follow that if ratings of other dimensions are 
less reliable; it is not because of the interface. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the cues 
need to make judgments on other dimensions 
are more easily disrupted by demands on visual 
attention. The issue invites research.
Towards a Standard Platform
Until recently, one of the obstacles to develop-
ment has been lack of standard instrumenta-
tion. Because the methods developed through 
HUMAINE and SEMAINE are relatively well 
tested and well known, they are a potential stan-
dard. Gtrace (for General trace) was developed 
with that in mind.
Gtrace is designed to be the successor to 
FEELtrace and related programs (Cowie et al., 
2000, 2010). The package includes the scales 
that were used in SEMAINE, on which informa-
tion is available, but it is designed to let people 
create their own scales with minimum effort, 
much as they could create their own items for 
a questionnaire.
The basic form of Gtrace rating is illustrated 
in Figure 2. On one side of the computer screen, 
raters see a recording that shows the video to be 
rated. On the other, they see a cursor that they 
can manipulate. In FEELtrace style, it takes 
the form of a coloured disc, which they can 
move on a left-right dimension. Cursor posi-
tion is recorded as fast as the machine allows, 
leaving decisions about appropriate sampling 
intervals to the user.
Table	5.	Average	correlations	between	rater	traces	
Rater Amusement Antagonism Tension
1 0.18 0.05 0.26
2 0.22 0.37 0.54
3 0.17 0.4 0.47
4 0.27 0.24 0.47
5 0.19 0.32 0.35
6 0.34 0.34 0.4
7 0.28 0.36 0.55
Average of rater 
correlations 0.23 0.3 0.43
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The cursor moves within a clearly marked 
rectangle, which has markers associated with 
it. There are usually light vertical lines dividing 
the rectangle into equal parts (halves, thirds, 
quarters, etc.). All the scales provided with 
Gtrace have text at each end of the rectangle, 
to indicate what the extremes of the scale mean. 
They usually also have a label associated with 
each dividing line. They may also have a cap-
tion that defines the attribute under consider-
ation. The colour of the cursor usually changes 
as it moves along the scale, in a way that goes 
naturally with the meaning of the scale. For 
example, in the valence scale included with 
Gtrace, the cursor is pure red at the negative 
extreme, and pure green at the positive extreme. 
It leaves a ‘tail’ behind it, in the form of circles 
that show where it was recently, and shrink 
away over time. Again, as in FEELtrace, the 
point of all these devices is to help raters to 
understand the scale in the way that was in-
tended.
It should be clear from previous sections 
that useful new scales probably remain to be 
discovered. That is why Gtrace allows for the 
construction of new scales. However, there is 
a strong argument for using preformed scales 
and procedures where they do exist. Scales that 
are nominally the same, but use different defini-
tions of the endpoints and internal landmarks, 
can produce materially different results – and 
therefore procedures developed on traces made 
with one set may not transfer well to traces made 
with another. The preformed scales that come 
with the Gtrace program include the dimen-
sions considered in Table 2, and the category 
terms considered in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Data on 
the others is available in (Cowie & McKeown, 
2010). The experimenter can either determine 
in advance which scales are to be used (as in 
the confrontation study described in Table 5) or 
allow raters choice, partial (as in the SEMAINE 
study) or complete.
Gtrace runs under current versions of 
Windows, and the code is available to allow 
customising and updates. It is one of the label-
ling tools in the HUMAINE toolbox (http://
emotion-research.net/toolbox), and can be 
downloaded from there.
PROSPECTS
Comparisons were made earlier between tracing 
and numerical questionnaire techniques. The 
differences were emphasised, but nevertheless, 
the two are parallel in interesting respects – 
methods of eliciting numerical descriptions 
of people’s impressions, with potentially a 
very wide range of applications. One of the 
interesting parallels is that questionnaire us-
ers quickly developed a very substantial body 
of research on their properties, psychological 
and mathematical. Because of the differences, 
conclusions do not transfer directly from ques-
tionnaire research. The parallel is that similar 
developments are needed if the potential of 
tracing is to be realised.
The development has not taken place 
partly because focusing on areas with relatively 
Figure	2.	Screen	shot	from	Gtrace
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specific needs – such as marriage guidance or 
music – does not obviously demand it. Providing 
traces for use in affective computing brings a 
broader range of challenges to the fore. Even 
so, it has only recently become apparent that 
the challenges define a substantial research 
area rather than simply obstacles to be over-
come. This paper is the first to articulate that 
understanding.
Carrying the development forward depends 
on a partnership between psychology per se and 
application areas, of which affective computing 
is currently the most challenging. Psychologists 
need the spur of practical demands to meet: 
computing needs insight into what the material 
available to it actually means, and the refine-
ments that are and are not possible. It promises 
to be a lively partnership.
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